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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
which the Court applied to the situation, disregarding the other two sections cited
above which bear on the sale of school property and which the Court admitted
would be more appropriate here. The section was construed to mean that the
electors may use their judgment as to what is the highest price, but where a
higher offer is before them, they are bound to accept. The majority are deemed to
be trustees, in a fiduciary relationship to the non-consenting property owners,' 7
and bound to get the best price.' The action taken by the majority of the school
district was also held to be illegal as a gift of property to promote objectives
outside the scope of the Education Law,' 9 and especially illegal as a gift of public
money to a religious establishment. 20
A vigorous dissent maintained that the statute 2' was applicable to give the
majority of the voters a free rein in deciding to whom and for what uses property
can be sold. The dissent was further based on the grounds that the statute pro22
viding there be no appeal from a decision of the State Education Commissioner
23
was applicable here, since his decision could not be deemed arbitrary. To prevent
abuses of authority by cliques in school districts, however, it would appear that
the majority view is more realistic.
Power to Maintain Parking Garages
No city in New York may give or loan its credit to or in aid of any individual
or any public or private corporation. 24 This does not prevent a city from making
a gift of money or property25 where such a gift is to further a proper public
governmental function.20 In Comereski v. City of Elmira,2r the court held a contract
between the City of Elmira and the Elmira Parking Authority,28 which provided
that the City pay to the Authority an amount equal to the deficit in the funds of
the latter which were available for the payment of Authority bonds, to be a valid
exercise the City's power. The City had the power to construct and maintain
parking garages,29 and funds spent here were used for a proper public use and
17. Godly v. Crandall cd Godly Co., 212 N. Y. 121, 105 N. E. 818 (1914).
18. Berner v. Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 175 F. 2d 218 (2d Cir. 1949).
19. N. Y. EDUCATION LAW § 414.
20 U. S. CONST. Amends. 1 and 14; N. Y. CONST. art. 9, § 4.
21.

N.

Y. EDUCATION LAW § 402.

22. Id., § 310.
23. Levitch v. Board of Education, 243 N. Y. 373, 153 N. E. 495 (1926).
24. N. Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1;Union Free School Dist. No. 3 v. Tow?& of
Bye, 280 N. Y. 469, 21 N. E. 2d 681 (1939).
25. Ibid.; Western N. Y. Water Co. v. Erie County Water Authority, 305
N. Y. 758, 113 N. E. 2d 152 (1953).
26. Denihan Enterprises, Inc. v. O'Dwyer, 302 N. Y. 451, 99 N. E. 2d 235
(1951).
27. 308 N. Y. 428, 125 N. E. 2d 241 (1955).
28. N. Y. PUBLIC AUTHORITIEs LAW § 1482 et seq.
29. N. Y. GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAw § 72-j.
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purpose.30 There was no illegal extension of the City credit 3' nor violation of the
Elmira Parking Authority Law, 32 which provided that neither the State nor City
were to be liable on Authority bonds nor were the bonds to be payable out of
funds other than those of the Authority. That law did not forid the transfer of
money to the Authority, especially where that transfer was part of a scheme of
33
action by which the City would satisfy a public requirement.
The dissent argued that the contract was in direct violation of the provisions
of the law 34 expressly forbidding the city from assuming any liability for payment
of the bonds, as this contract did in fact and in effect bind the city to meet Authority obligations. The dissent further argued that the contract also constituted .a gift
of credit by a city which was expressly prohibited. 3 5
On the basis of the authority cited by the majority of the Court and in view
of the needs of a modern city which must be provided by the most practical
methods available, the scheme entered into between the City and the Authority
can not be condemned.
Notice of Tort Claim
The General Municipal Law and the Education Law enumerate the persons to
be notified where notice is required as a condition precedent to bringing a tort
action against any municipal corporation or officer or employee thereof.36 The
prime if not the sole objective of the notice requirement of such a statute is to
insure a municipality an adequate opportunity to investigate the circumstances
surrounding the accident and to explore the merits of the claims while information
is readily available.3 7 Unless specific statutory provision requiring such a notice is
found, there need be no service of a notice in a common law tort action against
an employee of a municipality in his individual capacity," since he has first-hand
knowledge of the tort which he allegedly has committed. However, in those instances
where the law provides that the municipal corporation indemnify the employee
for a judgment recovered against him on a tort claim, the legislature may specifically require that a notice of claim be given, even when the employee alone is
sued.3 9
30. Denihan Enterprises, Inc. v. O'Dwyer, 302 N. .Y. 451, 99 N. E. 2d 235
(1951).

31. See note 24, aupra.

§ 1493.
Robertson v. Zimmerman, 268 N. Y. 52, 196 N. E. 740 (1935).
34. N. Y. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES LAW § 1493.
35. See note 24, supra.
36. N. Y. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW §§ 50(b), (d); N. Y. EDUCATION
32.

N. Y. PUBLIC AUTHORITS LAW

33.

§3813.
37.
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Teresta v. City of New York, 304 N. Y. 440, 108 N. E. 23 397 (1952).
38. O'Hara v. Sears Roebuck d Co., 286 App. Div. 104, 142 N, Y. S. 2d 465

(4th Dep't 1955).
39. N, Y. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS LAW
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